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Motion and observation in a single-particle universe
Author
Institute
Abstract. We outline an argument that a single-particle universe (a universe con-
taining precisely one pointlike particle) can be described mathematically, in which
observation can be considered meaningful despite the a priori impossibility of dis-
tinguishing between an observer and the observed. Moreover, we argue, such a
universe can be observationally similar to the world we see around us. It is arguably
impossible, therefore, to determine by experimental observation of the physical
world whether the universe we inhabit contains one particle or many – modern
scientific theories cannot, therefore, be regarded as descriptions of ‘reality’, but are
at best human artefacts. Our argument uses a formal model of spacetime that can
be considered either relational or substantivalist depending on one’s preferred level
of abstraction, and therefore suggests that this long-held distinction is also to some
extent illusory.
Keywords: First-order relativity theory, formal philosophy, philosophy of space-
time, observational indistinguishability, underdetermination, formal physical mod-
els.
Abbreviations: CST – causal set theory; FOL – first order logic; FORT – first
order relativity theory; GR – general relativity; SPU – single-particle universe.
Dedicated to Istva´n Ne´meti on the occasion of his 70th birthday.
1. Introduction
It has long been understood that the concepts of space, time and mo-
tion are intimately linked, so that questions relating to the nature of
spacetime depend inherently on one’s understanding of motion itself
(Huggett and Hoefer, 2009). Since motion is commonly taken to in-
volve changes in the relative positions or velocities of distinguishable
entities, the question arises whether motion can ever be considered em-
pirically meaningful in the context of a universe containing precisely one
pointlike particle (hereafter, a single-particle universe). Such a universe
contains no distinguishable particles whose separation in space or time
might be used as an empirical measuring rod, and there is no a priori
distinction between an observer and what it observes.
In this paper we outline a mathematical description of a single-
particle universe, and explain how a non-standard conception of motion
can be defined within it. We then show how this form of motion can
c© 2014 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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2be used to define what it means for an observation to be made, in
such a way that the single-particle universe is observationally similar
to the universe we see around us. It is, therefore, arguably impossible
to determine by scientific experimentation whether the universe we
inhabit contains one particle or many. This in turn has implications
for the debate concerning absolute vs relational motion, the question
of substantivalism, and the status of scientific theory.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the
underlying mathematical constructs use to express our model: Andre´ka
et al.’s first-order relativity theories (section 2.2), and Stannett’s fini-
tary reformulation of quantum theory (section 2.3). In section 3 we
describe our example of a single-particle universe and explain why
(subject to certain caveats) one would expect it to be observationally
similar to the world we see around us. We conclude in section 4 by
considering some implications of our model.
2. Theoretical Development
If motion means anything in the context of a single-particle universe,
it cannot mean relative motion, since there are no bodies relative to
which changes in position can be defined. Moreover, because there
are no bodies between which non-trivial relations can be defined, the
underlying spacetime cannot be relational. In short, if we are to define
what it means for the particle to ‘move’ within its universe, we must
necessarily start by providing an account based on absolute motion in
a substantivalist spacetime. Consider, therefore, a container spacetime
M ≡ (M, g), where M is a continuously differentiable manifold1 with
associated metric tensor g. Let P be a single pointlike particle, and
assume that P ’s motion is defined in absolute terms as a function
p : T → M where T is a partially ordered set (poset) of absolute
proper times and p(τ) indicates the absolute spacetime position of P
at absolute proper time τ ∈ T .
The (relative) motions we see around us on a daily basis suggest
that the paths followed by particles moving in M should be continuous
1 Following Earman and Norton (1987), we consider the accompanying stress-
energy tensor T to be contained within, rather than a constituent part of, spacetime;
but we reject their identification of spacetime with the manifoldM , adopting instead
Hoefer’s view that spacetime is more properly represented by the metric tensor g:
“To give the metric field without specifying the global topology—always possible
for at least small patches of space-time—is to describe at least part of space-time.
By contrast, to give the manifold without the metric is not to give a space-time, or
part of a space-time, at all.” (Hoefer, 1996, pp. 24–25)
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3functions of type R→M , so that T = R. At quantum scales we know
that the structure of spacetime may be considerably more complicated
than this suggests (Doplicher et al., 1995; Bojowald, 2012), but in fact
the assumption that absolute proper time should be representable by
R is not even justifiable at macroscopic scales, because it is important
to distinguish between time as experienced (by a particle), and time as
it appears (to an observer of that particle). The process of observation,
by which absolute motions are re-interpreted in relational terms, need
be neither passive nor straightforward, and there is no a priori reason
why time-as-experienced and time-as-observed should carry the same
order structure. (It is also necessary, therefore, to distinguish between
the underlying manifold M in which an observer considers itself to
move, and the manifold M ′ in which it is perceived to move by an
observer. Observations are the basis of appearances, and appearances,
we know, can be deceiving.) All we can safely suggest at this stage
is that observation is a process by which observers perceive absolute
trajectories (paths of type T → M) as relative ones (paths of type
R→M ′, say).
As we argue below, it is entirely possible to obtain a coherent theory
of observation even when absolute motion is assumed to be discrete
(T = N), and our model has the surprising consequence that ‘observed
reality’ in a single-particle universe can appear essentially the same as
the world we see around us. We are not claiming, of course, that a
single-particle universe must be represented as delineated below, only
that it is possible to define a ‘reasonable’ single-particle model in which
the observable structures of everyday life emerge naturally.
The approach we adopt below requires us to consider the empirical
(relational) behaviour of physical systems, so our first task is to explain
how a relational description of spacetime can arise as a result of discrete
observations by a point particle in an absolute single-particle universe.
Since P is the only inhabitant of its universe we first need to ask, what
do we mean by ‘observation’ in this context? This question cannot be
answered definitively, so we adopt the strategy of defining ‘observation’
as loosely as possible.
2.1. Manifolds generated by P ’s observations
Let us assume that P performs an ‘observation’ at each absolute proper
time t ∈ T . We have no way of establishing what P sees when it
performs an observation, but for convenience we will refer to the obser-
vation outcomes as locations. For our purposes it is enough to assume
that observations follow one another, so we shall take T = N. We as-
sume no notion of ‘duration’, since we want the concepts of (relational)
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4space and time to be generated intrinsically from P ’s observations. We
will nonetheless need to impose some structure on the set of locations,
and to the extent that this structure will be ordered, algebraic, etc, we
can say that its representation involves the use of “numbers” or “co-
ordinates” – but it should be remembered that this is just a linguistic
convenience. We are not suggesting that the particle itself is able to
‘perceive’ numeric or geometric structure. Formally, then, we assume
− a set L of locations;
− an internal clock, T = 〈0, 1, 2, . . .〉 ;
− a function at : T → L .
We read “x = at(t)” as “P coordinatizes itself to be at location x on its
t’th internal clock tick”. Note, we are not saying that P can identify its
location in M – the set L is entirely abstract, and has no intersection
with M ′.
Our goal is to endow L with enough topological structure that it
sensibly reflects the properties of a suitable general relativistic (GR)
manifold M ′ ≡ (M ′, g′) – recall that we cannot assume that M and
M ′ are identical – and we do so by choosing an M ′ in which L can be
embedded as a dense subset. Given this paper’s goals, we also require
M ′ to be a model of the first-order theory GenRel+ of general relativity
(see section 2.2 for an overview of first-order relativity theories), but
fortunately this constraint is automatically satisfied:
“. . . our notion of timelike geodesic coincides with its standard no-
tion in the literature on general relativity. All the other key notions
of general relativity, such as curvature or Riemannian tensor field,
are definable from timelike geodesics. Therefore we can treat all
these notions (including the notion of metric tensor field) in our
theory GenRel+ in a natural way. . . .” (Sze´kely, 2009, p. 98)
The approach we adopt uses ideas from the causal set theory (CST)
approach to quantum gravity (Dowker et al., 2004; Dowker, 2005). CST
starts by assuming that the universe is inherently discrete, but differs
from the development presented here in that it assumes an underlying
notion of causality from which the structure of observed spacetime is
induced. In contrast, we do not assume that P ’s observations carry an
up-front notion of causality (L is simply a set); this is important, be-
cause only a small proportion of causal sets can be embedded faithfully
in relativistic spacetimes (Smolin, 2006; Wu¨thrich, 2012).
Our choice of M ′ is essentially unconstrained: it is sufficient for
us to consider any spacetime M ′ ≡ (M ′, g′) and any dense sequence
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5〈x0, x1, . . . 〉 of points within it, provided the set {xn | n ∈ N} represents
a random sampling of the points in M ′. If we embed L in M ′ via the
mapping at(n) 7→ xn and endow L with the topology inherited from
M ′:
− randomness ensures that the symmetries of L are well matched2
by those of M ′;
− density ensures that every path in M ′ can be approximated arbi-
trarily closely by finite subpaths of P ’s trajectory.
We will write L′ for the set L equipped with the topological and metric
structure inherited from M ′.
This approach has a further consequence that will prove useful be-
low, when we come to discuss dynamical properties like action (section
2.3). The Einstein field equations for M ′ can be written Tαβ = (Gαβ +
Λg′αβ)/(8π), where the Einstein tensor G can be determined from g
′ ≡
g′αβ (Misner et al., 1973, 410). Since all of the terms on the right hand
side of this equation can be determined from g′ once a value for Λ (the
cosmological constant) has been specified, this allows us to determine
the associated energy-momentum tensor, Tαβ . In other words, even
though we have not assumed that P carries mass, we can nonetheless
consider M ′ (and hence its dense subspace L′) to carry a mass-energy
distribution which correctly generates the curvature inherited via the
metric tensor g′.
2.2. First-Order Relativity Theory (FORT)
Andre´ka, Ne´meti and their colleagues have argued extensively that
both the elegance and the subtlety of relativity theories can best be
appreciated when formulated within first order logic (FOL) (Andre´ka
et al., 2004, 2008, 2012; Madara´sz et al., 2007; Ne´meti and Andre´ka,
2006).
In their first-order relativity theories (FORT), (1+n)-dimensional
spacetime is represented as a vector space Qn+1 over an ordered field Q
of coordinates (or quantities). In general, Q is assumed to be Euclidean
(positive quantities have square roots inQ) or real-complete (Q satisfies
exactly the same first-order statements as R). Bodies, which are repre-
sented as objects of a second sort B, include both photons and inertial
observers, as well as more-general observers and particles depending
2 “The way to protect the embedding against a loss of Lorentz invariance is by
sprinkling the points randomly. Causal set theory uses a . . . Poisson sprinkling
[which] exhibits exact Lorentz invariance for Minkowski spacetime.” (Dowker, 2005,
p. 451)
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6on the particular version of relativity theory under discussion. We will
generally write x for points in Qn+1, m and k for inertial observers,
and b for general bodies.
The central FORT construct is the worldview relation W of type
B × B × Qn+1, where we interpret the statement W(m, b, x) to mean
“observer m considers body b to be present at spacetime location x”.
The worldline wm(b) followed by b according to m is then definable
as wm(b) = {x |W(m, b, x)}, and we can similarly use W to define
a worldview transformation wvt, which expresses the relationship be-
tween two observers’ views of events taking place around them: if m
sees body b at spacetime location x, then k sees it at wvt(k,m, b).
An important principle of the FORT approach is that axioms should
be as simple as possible. From a pedagogic standpoint, this makes
the proofs relatively believable for non-experts, since they assume only
things which can be explained easily in natural language; from a logical
standpoint, the approach ensures that proofs can be analysed to deter-
mine whether any of the axioms used are redundant or can be weakened
still further. For example, typical axioms3 of the theory SpecRel (used to
capture special relativity) include, where xj denotes the j
th component
of x and x0 is its ‘time component’:
AxSelf : W(m,m, x)⇒ (∀j > 0)(xj = 0))
“every observer considers itself to be at rest spatially”
and
AxEv : W(m, b, x)⇒ (∃y)W(k, b, y)
“all observers live in the same universe (see the same events)”.
In keeping with Einstein’s (1920) conception of spacetime as arising
from the relationships between the objects within it, together with
the observation that the interactions underpinning such relations can
only be verified empirically by observing induced motions, the FORT
approach generally assumes that b is fully specified from m’s point
of view (and hence from any other observer k’s, via the worldview
transformation) once its worldline wm(b) is given. In other words, as far
as FORT is concerned, a particle is its worldline. While it is a general
theorem of FORT that worldlines are (the images of) continuous paths
drawn on spacetime, Stannett (2009a) notes that the worldview relation
W captures only static information about the worldline as a whole, and
cannot identify the manner in which it is ‘populated.’
For example, AxSelf tells us that any observer m will consider its
worldline to be the time axis. Consider the interval [0, 3] along that
3 Universal quantification over free variables is assumed implicitly in these
axioms.
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7axis. While it is natural to think of the particle moving continuously
‘up’ the axis from 0 to 3, the same interval would also be swept out by
a particle performing the three consecutive continuous motions 0→ 1,
2 → 3 and 1 → 2. Such higher-level dynamics are invisible within
Andre´ka et al.’s theories, and we cannot argue within those theories
what form the underlying motion actually takes.
Far from being a shortcoming of the FORT approach, this inability
to reflect higher-level dynamics may be regarded as highly fortuitous,
since it provides a way to link first order relativity theories to a theory
of observation inspired by quantum theory, thereby allowing us to ex-
amine the single-particle universe in more detail. To this end, we briefly
review Stannett’s argument (2009a; 2009b; 2012) that continuous mo-
tion in FORT can be regarded as a form of “quantum illusion” within
an inherently discrete finitary quantum theory. We then show that a
single-particle universe can be described within an enhanced variant of
Stannett’s finitary model, and that its worldlines are again precisely
those of FORT.
2.3. Finitary quantum theory
The theory described in this section was introduced in (Stannett, 2009b)
as a finitary analogue of the ‘path integral formulation’, one of the
standard formulations of modern quantum mechanics (Feynman and
Hibbs, 1965). In order to find the probability that a particle moves
from one location to another by a path lying entirely in some spacetime
region R, the path integral formulation starts by assigning each possible
path a probability amplitude (a complex number). We then integrate
over all possible paths (taking care to include suitable normalisation
factors if appropriate) to find the amplitude that the motion occurs
via a path lying entirely in R: the magnitude of the result is the
probability required. The finitary approach is identical, except that
‘path’ is redefined to mean a finite random sequence of discontinuous
‘hops’.
Suppose M ′ ≡ (M ′, g′) is some spacetime for which there is a global
time function T ′ : M ′ → R such that T ′ increases as one moves in
the future direction along any timelike curve, and consider a particle
(for example, the particle P in the manifold in which L′ is embedded)
which moves through M ′ in a sequence of random ‘hops’. In other
words, the particle is equipped with an internal clock, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
and its relative positions 〈xt | t ∈ N〉 in M
′ form a stochastic sequence,
where all positions are measured by some inertial observer O whose
identity doesn’t concern us.
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8By the principle of stationary action, the worldline followed by a
particle moving from location x to location y will the one for which
action is stationary (to first order). We will call the action associated
with this path the standard action for the particle to move freely from
x to y, written S(x, y).
We have called the action S ‘standard’ because it corresponds to
the classical conception of motion as continuous displacement along an
R-parametrized future-pointing timelike path. Since random hop-based
motion need not respect T ′ in this way, we define a separate hop action,
s : M ′ ×M ′ → R, by
s(x, y) =
{
S(x, y) if T ′(y) > T ′(x)
S¯(y, x) if T ′(x) ≥ T ′(y)
where S¯(y, x) is the standard action for the particle’s anti-particle to
move from y to x. The status of this definition is slightly delicate.
While we can, if we wish, limit our attention to particles following
only timelike trajectories, it is also possible within FORT to study the
dynamics of particles travelling at superluminal speeds along spacelike
paths (Madara´sz et al., 2014). This draws attention to the signifi-
cance of the observer, since it is possible for one observer to see a
faster-than-light particle moving forward in time while another sees
it moving backwards in time. For negative-energy particles the hop
action can be seen as partially implementing the Stu¨ckelberg-Feynman-
Sudarshan-Recami “switching principle” (Stu¨ckelberg, 1941; Feynman,
1949; Bilaniuk et al., 1962), that “any negative-energy particle P trav-
elling backwards in time can and must be described as its antiparticle
P , endowed with positive energy and motion forward in time” (Sudar-
shan, 1970). However, first-order relativity theories can accommodate
motions of all kinds, depending on the choice of underlying axiom set
and so we make no such assumption.
As in the path integral formulation, we now associate each (hop-
based) path with a probability amplitude4: the amplitude of a hop
x ; y is defined to be the complex value 〈y | x〉 ≡ exp{ıs(x, y)/~},
where ~ is Plank’s constant. A finitary path f from a to b in M ′ is a
finite sequence (a =)x0, x1, . . . , xn, xn+1(= b) of (possibly repeated)
points in M ′, and its amplitude is defined to be
〈f〉 =
n∏
j=0
〈xj+1 | xj〉
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for noting that a related construction
was given by Adolphe Bu¨hl in 1934. This construction, which potentially provides
a physical meaning to the sums of certain ‘sawtooth’ hop trajectories, is described
in (Bachelard, 1968).
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to b via a path lying entirely in a region R ⊆ M ′, we again apply
certain normalisation factors and then integrate 〈f〉 over paths f =
〈a, x1, . . . , xn, b〉 for which all of the points a, x1, . . . , xn, b lie in R.
The key result we need in what follows is:
THEOREM 2.1 (Stannett, 2009b, §4.5). It is possible to define appro-
priate normalisation factors so that the hop-based amplitude that P
travels from a to b via a path lying entirely in R is precisely equal to the
amplitude given by the path-integral formulation of quantum mechanics.
2
Notice that it is not necessary for hops to have access to all points
in R. We can, if we wish, restrict attention to hops moving between
points in a dense subset D of R: given any finitary path f in R we can
approximate it as the limit of a net (fλ) of finitary paths lying entirely
in D, so we can replace the amplitude 〈f〉 in all relevant formulae with
the limit of the amplitudes 〈fλ〉 (Stannett, 2012).
3. A Single-Particle Universe Model
We are now ready to complete the description of our single-particle
universe model.
Let M ′ ≡ (M ′, g′) be any GR manifold for which a global time
function function T ′ can be defined, and let L′ be a densely embedded
subspace generated by random sampling in M ′. Although P is the only
particle in the absolute single-particle universeM , the freedom we have
in selecting (M ′, g′), coupled with the formal relationship between g′
and the matter distribution in M ′, means that M ′ can generally be
considered to contain a wide range of material particles (see section
2.1), some of which may be located at points in L′. We shall refer to
these as apparent particles.
Suppose, then, that we wish to determine the probability that an
apparent particle P ′ will move between locations x and y in L′ via
a finitary path lying entirely in some region R ⊆ L′. Since each such
path is also a finitary path inM ′, we can use the procedure described in
section 2.3 to assign it an associated hop-based action, and this action
will be consistent with the metric structure of L′ by density of L′ in
M ′. Integrating over all paths then gives us the overall amplitude for
the motion, and hence the required probability.
In other words, the unstructured absolute ‘observations’ performed
by the solitary particle P can be re-interpreted in a relational setting
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as observations of apparent particles within a dense countable subspace
L′ of any manifoldM ′ of the appropriate form – arguably including the
universe in which we find ourselves on a daily basis.
3.1. Caveats
The construction we have presented above is necessarily informal, and
should therefore be considered indicative rather than definitive. It should
also be noted that formal results concerning the use of finitary paths
to compute the probabilities of particle motions being observed have
only been published in the context of non-relativistic (Stannett, 2009b)
and special relativistic (Stannett, 2012) spacetimes. The extension to
general relativistic spacetimes is implied (Stannett, 2012, p. 57), but in
the absence of detailed proofs the justification presented there should
also be regarded as informal.
4. Implications and Further Questions
Our model has a number of implications. We consider two of these here,
though in the light of the caveats outlined in section 3.1 these require
further investigation.
Substantivalist or relational?
Our model is based on the supposition that a particle P exists in an
absolute spacetime M = (M, g), and that it has a clock capable of
showing absolute proper time. The set L of observations is entirely
abstract, and L′ inherits its structure from an absolute container space-
time M ′ ≡ (M ′, g′). The universe-as-assumed is, therefore, defined
entirely in absolute substantivalist terms. Nonetheless, the universe-as-
observed appears, depending on one’s choice of M ′, to contain a wide
range of material objects, and if we choose M ′ to be locally identical
to the observable ‘real world’, the equivalence of the finitary and path
integral formulations implies that L′ will appear under observation to
be essentially identical to the relational world of everyday empirical
experience. It follows that the world we see around us can be regarded
as either relational or substantivalist depending on ones preferred level
of abstraction. In essence, therefore, our model provides a purely formal
demonstration in support of Rynasiewicz’s view (1996, p. 279) that the
question whether spacetime is substantivalist or relational is “no longer
a meaningful one.” Rather, substantivalism and relationalism can be
seen as two sides of the same coin. As Glymour (1972, p. 215) puts it,
“Some conventions in physics arise just because more than one theory
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is in fact true, and in such cases any appearance of contradiction is
illusory.”
Science as artefact
Observations of relative motion lie at the heart of all modern scientific
theories of physical interaction – indeed, one may reasonably argue
that physical theories are nothing but theories of observed motion, since
they necessarily seek to explain and predict effects that must ultimately
be checked by human observers if their replicability is to be verified.
Our findings therefore suggest that scientific theories can at best be
regarded as human artefacts, since we can equally well explain all of
these underlying motions using a finitary model in which all observed
motion is illusory, or even a single-particle universe model in which
relative motion has no inherent meaning.
This view of science as an artefact that serves its purpose with-
out necessarily providing a ‘true’ picture of the world around us is,
of course, not new. It is implicit, for example, in Kuhn’s theory of
paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962). Modern scientific theories have replaced
earlier theories, and it is reasonable to assume that they will eventually
be replaced in their turn. Just as we can understand the rationale for
ancient beliefs and cosmologies while at the same time considering them
to be scientifically untenable, one can only wonder what the thinkers
of the next millennium will think of our current scientific beliefs.
4.1. Further Questions
Given the caveats outlined in section 3.1, it remains unclear to what ex-
tent the finitary hop description of observations extends fully to general
relativistic manifolds. Stannett (2012, p. 57) argues that the method
can be extended “to any model of spacetime in which it is possible
to specify which regions of spacetime are accessible from each current
location”, but does not provide detailed proofs, whereas our treatment
here focusses on spacetimes in which a global time function can be
defined. It would be useful to have a clearly formulated mathematical
proof as to the spacetimes in which observations can necessarily be
expressed using finitary path calculations, since it is precisely these
spacetimes from whichM ′ should be chosen. It would also be interesting
to see how easily purely formal proofs can be generated within different
FORT variants, describing (for arbitrary finite or infinite m and n) the
conditions under which an m-particle universe can be simulated by an
n-particle universe.5
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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